towards a dutch-belgian Settlement.
A COMMENTARY
on the questions raised by Belgium against Holland
by which it .is demonstratede
That Dutch Flanders and Limburg have been wrongfuily claimed from Holland;
That Holland has hitherto correctly fulfilled her obligations towards Belgium;
That it is of general interest that the relations between Holland and Belgium should be cordial;
That this can' only be brought about when harmony and confidence exist between the two countries.
THE HAGUE.
1919.
998
B
3



Hl











towards a dutch-belgian Settlement.
A COMMENTARY
on the questions raised by Belgium against Holland
by which it is demonstrated:
That Dutch Fianders and Limburg have been wrongfully claimed from Holland;
That Holland has hitherto correctly fulfilled her obligations towards Belgium;
That it is of general interest that the relations between Holland and Belgium should be cordial;
That this can only be brought about when harmony and confidence exist between the two countries.
THE HAGUE.
1919.







P R E F A C E.
The world is familiar with the reiterated remonstrances which have been made in certain Belgian periodicals, and in which their country is represented as suffering in various ways front the treaties concluded with the Netherlands in 1839, and front the manner in which these treaties have been carried out. It is both fust and necessary that the Dutch point of view on these subjects should be heard also.
The present pamphlet, issued by the Society for Dutch Propaganda, briefly summarises the Dutch arguments.
The reader will perceive that the accusations made against Holland cannot be seriously and fairly maintained, and that the best way to come to a satisfactory adjustment of the inseparable interests shared by the two countries, is to be found in facing the questions at issue in a spirit of mutual goodwill.







The Dutch-Belgian Question.
i.
A GOOD UNDERSTANDING WILL LEAD TO AN AGREEMENT.
Among the problems that have océupied the minds of statesmen since the conclusion of the armistice, that of the reconstruction of Belgium justly takes up a position of the very first importance. Holland, Belgium's neighbour, is not less anxious than any other nation that this reconstruction shall be of the most satisfactory kind. The part imposed on Holland by the war was very different to that forced on Belgium. Holland was never faced by the duty of taking up arms in defence of her territory and of espousing the cause of the Allies in doing so. Her neutrality has never been violated. Her bitter and often thankless task, therefore, was limited to the maintenance of this neutrality. The Dutch government have endeavoured to perform this task conscientiously, often, so to say, in the very teeth of the war raging on all borders of the kingdom. Even if some of their measures and decisions may possibly be considered open to legal objections, it must nevertheless be acknowledged that the government were always led by the sole desire of preserving an honest neutrality. The majority of the nation were pro-ally in their sympathies. More especially did the Dutch people pity the fate of the Belgians. This was proved by the profound emotion caused by the violation of Belgian neutrality; by the succour afforded to hundreds of thousands of Belgian fugitives who found shelter and assistance on Dutch soil; by the spontaneous protest



on the part of the Dutch government against the unjustifiable deportations of Belgian civilians; by the sincere joy feit at the re-establishment of Belgian liberty, a sentiment reflected in the official mission sent by Queen Wilhelmina to King Albert.
Loyal Dutchmen realize as fully as loyal Belgians must do on their part, that the interests of the two nations must in the future be made to harmonize as completely as possible. And the Peace Conference now sitting should set itself to consolidate this harmony. It must on no account create points of discord between the two nations. After the war, the Dutch and Belgian nations must face the future not only without animosity, but in perfect understanding. This will be in the interest of both nations; it will strengthen their economie development as well as their political power. And the question is of international importance also, for it cannot be indifferent to the whole of Europe, that in the important part of its continent which has for centuries born the name of "the Low Countries", peace and concord, united endeavour and prosperity shall prevail, rather than discord and strife. It was exactly to prevent the latter that the great Powers have.again and again, as in 1815 and in 1830, occupied themselves with the position of those countries.
Let it be said again, the moment seems to have arrived for Holland and Belgium to revise their relations by common accord and with a view to their future. On the Belgian side it has been urged that the present Peace negociations offer a favourable opportunity for submitting the Dutch-Belgian relations as a whole to a thorough revision. The Belgians have pointed out several shortcomings in these relations as actually existing. On the Dutch side a disposition has been shown to come to an understanding on this subject, on condition, however that neither the territorial status of the country, nor its vital interests be interfered with.
If Belgium's interests can be safeguarded better than they are at present, let the existing arrangements be revised by all means!



Modifications will have to be elaborated by common accord and in the first place between Holland and Belgium themselves. The respective rights and duties of the countries were formulated by the Dutch-Belgian Treaty of 1839, which recognized the independence of the Belgian state. This treaty having been concluded on the initiative of the Great Powers, under the auspices and with the guarantee of England, France, Austria, Prussia and Russia, these powers, and especially England and France, will have to be consulted on the subject of its revision.
It is also possible that new Great Powers, such as Italy, Japan and the United States, may desire to interest themselves in the matter. No one will deny, however, that in reality the principal points will have to be arranged between Holland and Belgium themselves.
Since it is desirable that these questions should be solved in a spirit of the greatest justice and fairness, we shall now enter into a systematic comparison between the different Belgian arguments and the Dutch point of view. The claims and interests of each must be weighed objectively. This is the only manner in which public opinion can be enlightened and can assist in arriving at a definite and satisfactory solution. There is no question of a struggle for or against Belgian or Dutch interests, but only of an endeavour to arrivé at a Dutch-Belgian agreement which shall be just, workable and fruitful. It appears that on the Belgian side complaints and accusations have been made against Holland. Though this was certainly contrary to the intentions of responsible Belgian statésmen, these complaints have given rise to unjust and inaccurate ideas. It will be well in the interest of mutual understanding, to be on guard against such attacks.
We would therefore request our readers to peruse with care the brief but accurate summary which is to follow. Numerous Belgian publications have seen the light. The following summary will set forth the Dutch point of view with reference to the subjects treated by them.



II.
CONCERNING THE NATURE OF THE DuTCH-BeLGIAN FRONTIER.
The frontier separating Holland and Belgium, especially in the region of Dutch Limburg and of Flanders, has been subjected to criticism by the Belgians from a military point of view.
Holland does not share this view. But even when accepting it, one cannot deny that this frontier has both a traditional and a national character. It can not be altered without cutting the body of the country to the quick and robbjng part of its inhabitants of their nationality against their will. "Military necessity", even if one admits the correctness of the arguments which explain it, would not justify the forceful alteration of the present frontier.
Is not the Ticino considered a Swiss Canton, though the natural frontier follows the St. Gothard ? Or again, would anyone think of incorporating Belgium with France, simply because the latter country would be more able to defend the approaches to the Meuse? It is no less unjust to blame Holland for possessing territories which have belonged to her for centuries, simply because the Belgian military authorities would like to utilize them.



The Military Position of Limburg. The Passage of military forces.
First some observations on the military significance of the territories in question, after which we hope to prove their importance to Holland from a national point of view. It is argued that the position of Dutch Limburg is such as to imperil Belgium in the case of an attack on the part of Germany. Experience has hitherto proved the contrary! Dutch Limburg has helped to safeguard Belgium. How much easier would the invasion of 1914 have been, if Dutch Limburg had been Belgian and therefore as accessible to the Germans as the rest of Belgium. How much more rapidly would the German armies have overflowed Belgium, crossed the Meuse and reached the French frontier! As things were, the neutrality of the Netherlands closed Dutch Limburg to the German forces, who had to effect their invasion through a narrow opening. It was therefore to the advantage of Belgium and the Allies, that Dutch Limburg lay across the path of the German. And even though admitting that Germany might not hesitate on a future occasion to violate Dutch territory, it must be acknowledged that the possession of South Limburg would not protect Belgium any more effectively. For on that case Germany could with equal ease envade Holland a little more to the North, march through North Brabant and attack Belgium on the extreme left flank. The difficulty would be shifted to a still more exposed point. The Belgian military authorities would consequently be forced to claim the whole of Holland as otherwise she might always somehow prove a danger.
This leads us to deny once again in passing the allegation that German troops crossed the territory of Dutch Limburg in 1914, in order to invade Belgium. Holland has always been able to refute this allegation, which was presumably spread in Belgium by the



German soldiers to inflame the Belgians against the Dutch. By the official publication of a great number of sworn depositions, the result of a minute inquiry, the Dutch government were at once in a position to prove the groundlessness of this accusation. Rather than agree to the free passage of German troops across their soil, the Dutch nation would have done what Belgium did, and have taken up arms to oppose them. Never, during any part of the war, has Holland permitted or facilitated the passage of German troops. Never before the war had she contemplated ever to do so. Contrary to certain Belgian insinuations, the construction of doublé track railways in South Limburg and Brabant had been undertaken solely with a view to the economie development of these districts.
It is also not correct to say that Holland had left South Limburg without defences. The moment has not yet come to explain in detail the strategie system adopted by Holland during the last few years. But there can be no harm in stating that since the outbreak of the war this system has by no means been confined to a system of offering resistance in the heart of the country only. The fact that the field army was stationed in Limburg and Brabant proves the contrary. And at the outbreak of hostilities the military forces in Limburg were considerably increased.
Holland energetically protests against these accusations according to which Limburg has afforded facilities to the Germans.
In "La question du Limbourg", published by the "Comité de Politique nationale beige", it is alleged that in August 1914 or later, German airmen were allowed over the Meuse. This is contrary to the truth.
As to the attitude of the Dutch government with regard to the passage of retreating German troops in November 1918 after the signing of the armistice, it has been very fully explained in official statements. Permission was granted for these Germans to pass through, after they had been disarmed and deprived of their baggage, with a view to furthering the liqui-



dation ol the war in conformity with the Allied interests. To refuse this passage would have served no object. These German troops would have had ample time to skirt round Limburg and to reach their country within the limit of time fixed by the armistice conditions. The Allies would in any case not have had the opportunity of forcing them to surrender.
II- — The Frontier of Dutch Flanders and the Scheldt.
It is an equally undeniable fact that the neutrality of the rest of Dutch territory, including the Scheldt and Dutch Flanders, has proved a means of protection to Belgium.
It has rendered the invasion of Belgium more difficult to the Germans, as well as their defence of Antwerp once they were in possession of this city. The assertion has sometimes been made that a British squadron, sailing up the Scheldt as far as Antwerp, would have saved Belgium. But is there really any ground to suppose that such a squadron was ready? On the contrary, England had never made preparations for such an enterprise. Neither has any proposition ever been made to Holland in this connection. After the fall of Antwerp the neutrality ol the Scheldt was favourable to the Allies and unfavourable to the Germans, as Germany could not use the mouth of the Scheldt as a base for its operations. Holland systematically prohibited any military use of this river.
It is further incorrect to say that if the mouth of the Scheldt and Dutch Flanders had not been neutral Dutch territory, the Belgian forces could more easily have retreated before the Germans in 1914 without the risk of being interned, and that they would have been better able to carry with them their military stores. Would it not be more reasonable to say that in that case the Germans, having the mouth of the Scheldt at their disposal, would probably have succeeded in taking more booty and more prisoners, who now escaped them?



Military Cooperation between Holland and Belgium.
We have thus seen that, as regards the Dutch-Belgian frontier in Limburg and Zealand, the military and strategie arguments have failed to prove that these frontiers have been fatal to the Belgian cause. All evidence goes to prove the contrary.
It is, however, incontestable that both parties might be the gainers from certain military arrangements, which could by mutual agreement be made between the two countries, in the interest of their joint security and the world's peace. But this is a very different question, which has not yet come up for discussion.



III
III. Dutch Flanders and Limburg are integral parts
OF THE KINGDOM OF THE NeTHERLANDS.
Now let us ask ourselves the following question: Are not Dutch Flanders and the mouth of the Scheldt together with south Limburg truly Dutch districts? The answer to this question cannot be in doubt. These districts could not be separated from the Kingdom of the Netherlands without doing violence to the integrity of its truly national territory or to the wishes of the inhabitants. These wishes have recently been expressed with unmistakable clearness, as soon as the idea of readjusting the frontiers had been suggested by the Belgians. Both in Dutch Flanders and in Limburg almost a hundred percent of the population took part in an energetic demonstration against the proposed separation from Holland.
1. Dutch Flanders.
Dutch Flanders has been Dutch territory since the end of the XVIth century. From the moment when the independent State of the Northern Netherlands was first constituted, the left bank of the Scheldt has formed part of it. When in 1585 Antwerp surrendered to the Spaniards, Dutch Flanders was at once occupied by the Hollanders, as the security of their entire territory depended on it. This state of affairs has never been



altered. Dutch Flanders continued to form part of the Republic of the Seven Provinces, as the possession of the mouths of the Scheldt was bound up with the security of the State and as it was only in this way that the waterways which give admittance to the very heart of the country could be kept under Dutch control. Dutch Flanders has consequently remained attached to the Netherlands since the XVII* century. The Treaty of Westphalia (1648) ratified this state of affairs. The frontiers were fixed in detail in 1664. And though the line of demarcation has from time to time been slightly modified in the course of the centuries, the country has always remained Dutch from Sluys to Hulst and Métier-de-Hulst, Cadzand, Neuzen, Biervliet and Sas-van-Gent. It has never in any way formed part of Belgium. At the time of the French occupation in 1795 it was not made part of Belgium, but was formed into a French department, in spite of the opposition of the population, who desired to remain Dutch. In 1814, when the independence of the Netherlands was re-estabished, Dutch-Flanders was again joined to Holland. When in 1815 Belgium was united to Holland, Dutch-Flanders remained part of the province of Zeeland, although the population would then have had an excellent opportunity of joining Belgian Flanders, had they so desired. In the mixed commission which drew up the constitution of the united Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Belgian members abstained from changing this relation, because according to the report of M. Raepsaet, himself a Belgian, "we might have been disowned by the inhabitants". The same thing happened in 1830 when Belgium seceded. The population of Dutch Flanders refused to make common cause with the Belgian revolutionaries. They helped on the contrary to expel the armed bands which had invaded their territory. Dutch Flanders was never consigned to Belgium by any of the partition projects proposed by the Powers, not even by that of June 26* 1831, which was the most favourable to Belgium. It has consequently always remained



Dutch territory and can only be considered as an inseparable part of Holland.
2. Limburg.
The bonds uniting Holland and its present province of Limburg date back from 1632. Since that date a territorial unity has developed, which has gradually made it into an integral part of the northern Netherlands. A clear proof of this was furnished when, during the last few months, almost the entire population, openly declared themselves against separation. For Holland the so-called Lands beyond the.Meuse have always been a guarantee for her national integrity. First the town of Maestricht and its enclave and Valkenburg were made into Dutch territory. From the very beginning of the war of independence this city came to be considered as one of the "barrier places" of the Netherlands. Subsequently this system of "barrier places" was gradually extended with the sanction of the European Powers themselves. The rights of the Netherlands to Maestricht and to the other territories in question, were recognized in 1648 by the European treaties of Westphalia. In 1715 part of Upper Guelders, (that is to say the northern part of the present province of Limburg which wrongly bears this name, "Upper Guelders" being more in accordance with historie truth,) was also incorporated with Holland as one of its "barrier districts" by the will of Europe as expressed in the Treaties of Utrecht. In this part were included the towns of Venlo and Stevensweert (the other part then being joined on to Prussia). Between these two Dutch points of support on the lower Meuse, there remained Ruremonde, which belonged to the Austrian Netherlands, and Sittard which belonged to the Duchy of Juliers. These territories were not added to Holland, until after the revolutionary period in 1814—15. In spite of Prussia's claim to the right bank of the Meuse this district was then handed over to Holland, thus securing to that country the



"districts bordering the Meuse", formed by the union of the old enclaves till beyond Maestricht.
During the Belgian revolution in 1830, the Belgians temporarily occupied Ruremonde and Venlo, the Dutch remaining masters at Maestricht. However, the latter at the same time energetically maintained that the ancient Lands beyond the Meuse must be recognized as belonging to Holland as a whole, in accordance with historical dévelopment. The Powers recognized these claims by the ratification of the 24 articles in 1833, though the final treaty of 1839 was required to induce the Belgians to acquiesce in the existing status of Dutch Limburg.
It is therefore both unjust and inaccurate to assert, as is now often done by the Belgians, that Holland has "torn" these territories from Belgium. What did the conclusion of the Treaty of 1839 mean?
In the first place the delimitation of Dutch territory appears, not as an arbitrary act on the part of the Netherlands, but as a decision taken by the five great Powers under whose auspices and guarantees the arrangement was made.
Secondly this territorial settlement was recognized by Belgium on her own responsibility. Having on their side obtained concessions, the national assembly accepted the arrangement proposed by the Treaty with a large majority. It is interesting to read in this connection a volume published under the title of "Histoire parlementaire du Traité de paix entre la Belgique et la Hollande" (in 1839 at Brussels by the Librairie Universellé). The reader of these reports will indeed observe that several deputies then expressed their regret at the fact that Ruremonde and Maestricht were granted to the Northern rather than to the Southern Netherlands.
There existed, indeed, in those days a strong proBelgian party in Limburg, which will not be a matter for surprise to those who are conversant with the history of the separation. They will remember that Limburg is almost wholly Roman Catholic and that the separation was caused in the first instance by the dis-



Content aroused among the Roman Catholics through the policy of the Dutch government of the period. But in spite of this opposition the representatives of the Belgian people accepted the present territorial arrangement, as proposed by the Belgian government. And we may be permitted to recall to our readers the utterance of a member of the minority in the session of march 6th 1839, who said in the course of his speech : "The majo"rity are opposed to us, but if Limburg is not joined "on to Belgium, the cause will be the attitude adopted "by three ministers who are Limburg or Luxemburg "men by birth."
Which shows again that Belgium decided on her own account. Moreover, in clause 6 of the Dutch Belgian treaty the two nations reciprocally agreed to renounce "for ever all claims to territories, towns, and "places situated within the borders of the other party's "domain".
It may therefore be justly said that the present situation in Limburg was Consolidated with the full cooperation of Belgium, under the auspices of the Great Powers, led by England, assembled in London.
Thirdly, the question arises how the frontier line of the Dutch territory in Limburg was fixed. This was done by no fortuitous decision. We have already seen that before the creation of the Kingdom of Holland in 1814 there had never been any question of the political unity of Limburg. What is now Dutch Limburg had for two centuries contained important Dutch territories (Maestricht, Valkenburg, Stevensweert and Venlo), as well as several independent principalities, some German territory, and lastly the Ruremonde district which belonged to Austria. When unity was created in 1839 and the ancient territorial claims of the Netherlands were granted priority, it became necessary to round off the old frontiers. The few enclaves, granted to the United Kingdom of the Netherlands in 1815, though they had not belonged to Holland before the revolution, were duly recognized as Dutch in 1839. By way of indemnity for the necessary adjustments



"districts bordering the Meuse", formed by the union of the old enclaves till beyond Maestricht.
During the Belgian revolution in 1830, the Belgians temporarily occupied Ruremonde and Venlo, the Dutch remaining masters at Maestricht. However, the latter at the same time energetically maintained that the ancient Lands beyond the Meuse must be recognized as belonging to Holland as a whole, in accordance with historical development. The Powers recognized these claims by the ratification of the 24 articles in 1833, though the final treaty of 1839 was required to induce the Belgians to acquiesce in the existing status of Dutch Limburg.
It is therefore both unjust and inaccurate to assert, as is now often done by the Belgians, that Holland has "torn" these territories from Belgium. What did the conclusion of the Treaty of 1839 mean?
In the first place the delimitation of Dutch territory appears, not as an arbitrary act on the part of the Netherlands, but as a decision taken by the five great Powers under whose auspices and guarantees the arrangement was made.
Secondly this territorial settlement was recognized by Belgium on her own responsibility. Having on their side obtained concessions, the national assembly accepted the arrangement proposed by the Treaty with a large majority. It is interesting to read in this connection a volume published under the title of "Histoire parlementaire du Traité de paix entre la Belgique et la Hollande" (in 1839 at Brussels by the Librairie Universellé). The reader of these reports will indeed observe that several deputies then expressed their regret at the fact that Ruremonde and Maestricht were granted to the Northern rather than to the Southern Netherlands.
There existed, indeed, in those days a strong proBelgian party in Limburg, which will not be a matter for surprise to those who are conversant with the history of the separation. They will remember that Limburg is almost wholly Roman Catholic and that the separation was caused in the first instance by the dis-



Content aroused among the Roman Catholics through the policy of the Dutch government of the period. But in spite of this opposition the representatives of the Belgian people accepted the present territorial arrangement, as proposed by the Belgian government. And we may be permitted to recall to our readers the utterance of a member of the minority in the session of march 6* 1839, who said in the course of his speech: "The majo"rity are opposed to us, but if Limburg is not joined "on to Belgium, the cause will be the attitude adopted "by three ministers who are Limburg or Luxemburg "men by birth."
Which shows again that Belgium decided on her own account. Moreover, in clause 6 of the Dutch Belgian treaty the two nations reciprocally agreed to renounce "for ever all claims to territories, towns, and "places situated within the borders of the other party's "domain".
It may therefore be justly said that the present situation in Limburg was Consolidated with the full cooperation of Belgium, under the auspices of the Great Powers, led by England, assembled in London.
Thirdly, the question arises how the frontier line of the Dutch territory in Limburg was fixed. This was done by no fortuitous decision. We have already seen that before the creation of the Kingdom of Holland in 1814 there had never been any question of the political unity of Limburg. What is now Dutch Limburg had for two centuries contained important Dutch territories (Maestricht, Valkenburg, Stevensweert and Venlo), as well as several independent principalities, some German territory, and lastly the Ruremonde district which belonged to Austria. When unity was created in 1839 and the ancient territorial claims of the Netherlands were granted priority, it became necessary to round off the old frontiers. The few enclaves, granted to the United Kingdom of the Netherlands in 1815, though they had not belonged to Holland before the revolution, were duly recognized as Dutch in 1839. By way of indemnity for the necessary adjustments



certain compensations in Luxemburg were granted to Belgium.
The bonds between Limburg and the Kingdom of the Netherlands have been gradually gaining in strength since 1839. The Roman Catholic inhabitants of the province having cooperated with the liberal North to bring about a revision of the constitution in 1848, Limburg resisted every attempt at German propaganda, which endeavoured at this time to substitute for the nominal bond between this Dutch province and the German League a real tie with a "new and greater Germany". Limburg never hesitated, but remained staunch to Holland and her modern political institutions.
Its definite secession from the German League took place in 1866—67.
It is no longer necessary to prove the present feelings for Holland in Limburg. The Dutch language has made great strides. The other parts of the Kingdom are alive to the interests of the Southern provinces. Thousands of Dutch people spend their holidays amidst its charming scenery, tens of thousands find work in its industrial centres. Economie interests have strengthened these ties still further. Limburg is the only part of Holland which produces coal. Other minerals are also found and the capital required to work the mines partly comes from the northern provinces. It is therefore quite wrong to say, as is sometimes done by some Belgians, that Limburg will always be a burden to Holland. On the contrary, Limburg is a valuable asset in the economie life of the country. The railway system now comprises three doubletrack railroads: Maestricht-Venlo-Nimwegen; Maestricht-Ruremonde-Venlo-Eindhoven and MaestrichtWeert-Eindhoven (since 1913). The communication could be still further improved by rendering the Meuse navigable. The opposition against effectuating this has not come from the Dutch side, as we shall see presently.



IV
Economic Interests.
Avoid unjust complaints. The Road to Joint Progress.
Up till now the questions that have been considered have been of a political, territorial or military nature. At the root of most questions, however, one generally finds material interests. It is the same with the questions which we are now considering. It will nevertheless be seen that the complaints made on this subject by the Belgians, are either grossly exaggerated or absolutely untenable. Holland and Belgium should aim rather at economic cooperation than at reciprocal opposition. The exorbitant accumulation of grievances lately formulated against Holland cannot be favourable to a good understanding between the two countries, unless they be reduced as soon as possible to their proper dimensions.
1. The competition between the sea-ports.
First let us see whether it is correct to say, as is sometimes done, that the frontier between Holland and Belgium as fixed in 1839, is fundamentally opposed to the economie interests of Belgium.
This must be unhesitatingly denied. It may be said with perfect sincerity that the fixing of these frontiers implied no Dutch policy to hurt Belgian economic interests. When Belgians speak of a struggle between



Rotterdam and Antwerp, there can only be question of a natural competition. It is wrong to say that Holland is making an unfair use of its present frontier. If cases should ever arise in which Belgian interests were somehow compromised, this could only occur in questions of detail, which could easily be arranged between the two countries by mutual consent.
It is true that in past ages the Dutch have made use of their possession of the mouths of the Scheldt in order to injure Belgian commerce. The Peace of Munster in 1648 had as a matter of fact given them the power to do so. But this is an old story, which it would be unfair to bring up against Holland to-day. This state of things came to an end towards the close of the 18* century, and throughout the 19* century the Dutch have put no hindrances into the path of Belgian trade. The old question of the closing of the Scheldt has long ceased to exist. If one wanted to blame the Dutch for such a policy at this distance of time, one would have to attack the entire political and economic system of the 17* and 18* centuries. And it certainly were not the Dutch who applied it in its harshest form. The tolls on the Sound, the English monopoly of colonial navigation and many more examples go to prove that other nations have exercised exclusive rights of this nature.
For over a hundred years all arguments based on this grievance have been without value as far as commercial shipping on the Scheldt is concerned. On the occasion of the separation of 1839 the treaties acknowledged the full and entire liberty of Belgian shipping. For the purpose of establishing Antwerp's liberty of commercial navigation, it is therefore not necessary to revise the Treaty of 1839.
In fact, it cannot be denied that on both the Meuse and the Scheldt contractual rights have been granted to Belgium very much more extensive than would follow from the general "régime" laid down in the principles of the congress of Vienna, and having reference to the riparian states of navigable waterways. The control



which Holland has the right to exercise on the Scheldt for the purpose of collecting her customs duties and enforcing her sanitary regulations, has been reduced to a minimum. Antwerp shipping has been entirely withdrawn from Dutch control. Contrary to the provisions of the Final Act of Vienna the care of the river itself has not been entrusted to each state on its own territory, but the state of the channel, the buoyage and lighting of the Dutch part have been entrusted to the joint care of a mixed Dutch-Belgian committee. Belgium has been granted the right of keeping on the Scheldt a pilot service which, together with the Dutch service, is under the control of the mixed committee. The moderate pilot charges have been fixed by mutual arrangement and are the same for all nations.
As to the right of fishing, it must be observed that the principles of international law reserve the right of fishing on any territory to the inhabitants of the country to which it belongs. Yet Belgium has obtained the right to fish and to deal in fish on the Dutch Scheldt on an equal footing with the Dutch.
Tolls no longer exist. Though the Treaty of 1839 had allowed their levying they were abolished by the International Convention of 1863 when the Dutch rights were bought off for what was in comparison a small sum.
It is therefore quite untrue to say that Holland can still check or systematically injure Belgian commercial shipping on the Scheldt.
On the contrary Dutch sovereignty on the Scheldt has already been submitted to regulations that narrow its application very considerably. This, however, must not be understood to imply, that the stipulation of the convention of 1839 does leave room for supposing the sovereignty over the Scheldt to have become in any way a joint sovereignty. Such a "condominium" was not granted to Belgium. Whilst subject to special conditions, the undivided sovereignty was left to Holland alone.
The few publicists who believe that they may infer from its present legal status the existence of a condominium on the Dutch Scheldt, would certainly not be



prepared to admit a similar condominium on the Belgian Scheldt from Antwerp to the frontier. Yet this is what would logically result from their interpretation of the treaties of 1839, and therefore proves their argument to be altogether erroneous.
Experience has shown that the prosperity of the ports of Rotterdam and Amsterdam is perfectly compatible with that of Antwerp. All three ports have largely had their share of the increase in shipping during the decades which have preceded the war. Each has its own special line. Antwerp is chiefly the port for merchandize in bales, and specializes in the fixed steamship lines and export. Rotterdam is the port of transit for goods in bulk; Amsterdam is also a port for cargoes in bales, for fixed steamship lines and for Dutch colonial produce.
The present status of the mouths of Rhine and Scheldt guarantees a prosperous future for all three in an equal degree.
2. The manner in which the treaties of 1839 have been carried out.
Since the commencement of the "diplomatic war" on the subject of the treaties of 1839, Holland has been represented as having often carried out these treaties in a vexatious manner. We shall now proceed to refute in detail these allegations and to show the unreasonableness of the accusations made against the attitude of this country.
For this purpose we shall successively discuss: «) The closing of the Eastern Scheldt and the connection with the Rhine. The canal of Hansweert;
b) The control over the channel and the mouth of the Western Scheldt;
c) The pilotage charges;
d) The application of the pilotage regulations;
e) The canal from Ghent to Terneuzen;
f) The drainage of Flanders;



g) The fishermen of Bouchoute and the Isabella Lock;
h) Proposed new connections with the Rhine;
/') The Communications of Antwerp with the German hinterland;
/) Navigation in the "enclave" of Maestricht; k) The canalization of the Meuse in Limburg.
a) The closing of the Eastern Scheldt and the connection with the Rhine. The canal of Hansweert.
Holland has been reproached by Belgium on account of the closing of the Sloe and the Eastern Scheldt, measures which were alleged to be prejudicial to the shipping on the Western Scheldt. The very opposite is the case. This measure, which had been considered by the Dutch Government since 1846, in the interest of traflic on the Eastern Scheldt, has, as a matter of fact, also served to correct the currents in the Western Scheldt. This was acknowledged by a Belgian diplomat Baron Guillaume, in his book l'Escaut depuis 1830 (vol. II, p. 80, c. 3). In spite of all efforts to the contrary the Eastern Scheldt was rapidly beraming choked up. The construction of the canal of Hansweert, connecting the two arms of the Scheldt, has considerably improved the situation. Holland simply availed herself of her right to cut off an existing communication between Rhine and Scheldt, a right which had been granted to her by clause 9, paragraph 8 of the Treaty of 1839, but at the same time she scrupulously observed her contractual obligation to replace this communication by another, equally safe and practicable waterway. This canal has, moreover, been continually improved and enlarged ever since. At the moment of writing an important enlargement of the locks is in course of construction.
In passing through this canal, ships may possibly experie'nce a certain amount of delay. This is a drawback common to all canals. But the inconvenience was very much greater on the Eastern Scheldt, where it was



always necessary to wait for the nood tide. As to the raising and enlarging of the navigable space under the bridge at Vlake, a bridge which to Belgian bargemen seems to be a source of complaint, it must be obvious that this point, like other technical questions touching the navigation, can again be taken into consideration.
Excessive mistrust on the part of Belgium.
The history of the closing of the Sloe and the Eastern Scheldt furnishes a characteristic example of the excessive mistrust which Belgium has shown in questions related to the Scheldt, a mistrust which Holland has done nothing to deserve. When the Dutch plans had assumed a positive form, a long correspondence commenced between Holland and Belgium, in which Belgium called special attention to the possible complete choking up of the Western Scheldt in consequence of the projected closing of the Eastern arm.
The Dutch technical authorities expressly denied the existence of this danger; on the other hand the most serious reproaches were levelled by the Belgians against Holjand. When, after several attempts to organize a joint examination, the Belgian government instituted a semi-ofhcial enquiry, impartial experts were forced to acknowledge that the Dutch point of view was the correct one! The English, French and Prussian governments appointed in 1866 these experts, each of whom was to present an independent report to his government. The inquiry, which did not bear the character of an arbitration, but which was instituted in order to obtain first hand information in a semi-official way, was conducted without any meddling on the part of the Dutch authorities, though they facilitated it by all possible means. When we ask what were the conclusions come to by these foreign experts, as communicated by the Belgian authorities to the Dutch government, it is found that with the possible exception, to a certain extent, of the English expert, they all failed to see



any danger in the closing up of the Eastern Scheldt, but rather recognized that certain advantages might result from it.
By this it was proved that the Dutch project had been made in good faith and with due consideration of the shipping interests.
b) The control over the channel and the mouth of the Western Scheldt.
Secondly the control over the channel of the Western Scheldt is said to be, in its present form, a source of discontent.
Up till the present however no important complaints have ever been brought to the notice of the Dutch government. Everything necessary in the interest of Antwerp has always been done. It will not be differrent in the case of the works which have become necessary by the natural deterioration during the years of war.
It is indeed asked what causes of complaint the foreign-going trade of Antwerp can be supposed to have to day. The very largest vessels find the necessary depth and space.
The Belgians are not badly served. About twenty years ago Dutch skippers demanded in vain some gas-buoys on the Scheldt. They were refused on account of the considerable outlay involved. But very shortly after the Belgian pilot service made a request for gas-buoys.
They were at once furnished in profusion!
The Dutch pilots have again and again requested that one of the piers at Terneuzen might be provided with a siren in case of fog. The mixed committee replied that the cost was to high with regard to its utility. Yet one may be sure that if Belgium were to express the same desire, it would receive satisfaction without delay.
Would the channel of the river be better, ifitwere under the sole control of the Belgian authorities?



Would every necessary improvement be brought about at once, if the Scheldt were Belgian territory?
The improvements of the Scheldt near Antwerp, where Belgium is absolute mistress, have for years been the subject of diffuse discussions, by which it is proved that the cause of delay is not to be sought in the joint administration of the Dutch mouth of the Scheldt
Another Belgian grievance is that the mixed committee have not the right to present their views with regard to the construction of dykes and polders along the banks. According to the treaties Holland is, indeed, under no obligation to submit these questions to the committee. Belgium cannot demand that the committee shall be consulted on works executed outside the channel of the Western Scheldt and its mouth.
Article 9, paragraph 2, of the Treaty lirriits the powers of the committee expressly to the river proper.
There is however, no shadow of proof in support of the allegation that Dutch works of this nature have exercised a bad influence on the Scheldt as a navigable waterway.
The creation of fresh polders in Dutch Flanders by the Dutch follows a normal course without ever being pushed to extremes.
Newly originated mud-flats are never dyked in until they have arrived "at maturity" by natural accretion, i. e. when they are no longer submerged at high tide.
c) The pilotage charges.
It is sometimes said that the charges for pilotage on the Scheldt are used by the Dutch as a means to favour the trade at Rotterdam. In all Belgian representations on this subject, however, one thing is always forgotten, viz: that the distance from Antwerp to the sea is much greater than that of Rotterdam. The pilotage to Antwerp by way of the Scheldt is therefore



necessarily more costly than that to Rotterdam by way of the Meuse.
Holland has always kept to the provisions of the treaties which prohibit the existence on the Scheldt of pilotage charges higher per kilometer than those on the Meuse.
d) The application of the pilotage regulations.
As rowing-boats and sailing-vessels could no longer be considered sufficiënt in all cases, Belgium put into service a motor pilot-boat.
Holland followed this example, and constructed a motor-boat, which was finished during the war, but which was not put into the service at that period. It was arranged between the two countries that Belgium would not use its boat, until the Dutch boat had been put into the service, except to carry pilots to ships, of which it was known that they did not employ Dutch pilots.
It seems that Belgium now complains of this proceeding. Yet it is the application pure and simple of the pilotage regulations of 1843: if the Belgi ans wish to employ a motor-boat or steamer in their pilot service, the Dutch are to place no impediment in their way, on condition that Holland is allowed time to arrange its service in a similar manner. The initiative in these marters naturally belongs to Belgium, whose interests are here greater than those of Holland. This initiative has never been hindered by the Dutch.
e) The Canal from Ghent to Terneusen.
With respect to the canal Ghent—Terneuzen, it is especially Senator Coppieters who has formulated the Belgian grievances, in the course of an interview with the Belgian newspaper "Le Peuple". These grievances had never been precisely formulated. The appearance of this interview has rendered possible



a Dutch reply which was both prompt and conclusive (*).
The Belgian part of the canal Ghent—Terneuzen was brought up to its present dimensions by works executed in the years 1900—1910, as a result of an agreement between Holland and Belgium dated June 20th 1895, modified March 8th 1902. The dimensions of the profile of the canal are there fixed entirely in accordance with Belgian interests as indicated on the part of Belgium. No restrictions whatever were made on the part of Holland.
We may mention, however, that while the preparatory works were in progress the Dutch experts gave as their opinion that the proposed dimensions did not seem to them sufficiënt, with a view to future development of the traffic. But of these observations no account was taken by the Belgians.
On Dutch territory the original plans were carried out in constant touch with the Belgian Board of Works and with its entire approbation. When in 1901, while the new locks at Terneuzen were in course of construction, it became evident that the works executed according to the convention of 1895 would notenable Ghent to compete with the larger ports, Holland showed herself perfectly willing to conform to the new Belgian desires, the result being a new agreement in 1902. Ghent then profited by the faet that the Dutch service of Public Works had always foreseen the necessity of eventual modifications. It was thus possible to give to the canal a depth of 8 m. 75 and a bottom-width of 24 meters with a surface-width of 67 meters, without excessively delaying the completion of the undertaking. On the Belgian part it was possible to increase these dimensions still further, because the work was not so far advanced there. What was done on Dutch territory was entirely in accordance
(*) Compare on this subject a very full article in the Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant of March 28, 1919.
\



with the desires expressed by the Belgians, whilst the Dutch had laid stress on the advantage of adopting larger dimensions from the start.
In the Dutch section vessels may pass one another any where, whilst the bridges are the same width as on the Belgian side (27 meters). The Dutch section as well as the Belgian one is lighted over its entire length with electricity.
It may, therefore, be said with perfect truth that navigation in the Dutch section of the canal is provided for in an entirely satisfactory manner and with all good faith. Which does not prevent new arrangements from being discussed between the two governments and their services of Public Works in a friendly spirit.
Nothing can be more just than that the improvements to the canal should have been defrayed by Belgium. They were made exclusively to serve Belgium interests. The execution of these works on Dutch territory was by no means exclusively entrusted to Dutch contractors. Belgian contractors had a large share in the work. On the other hand the works in the port of Terneuzen, which concern Dutch interests, have never cost Belgium a penny.
The annual cost of the upkeep and the service of the canal which in accordance with the convention is defrayed by Belgium, and which amounts to a sum of 94.500 florins, cannot be considered excessive for a canal of such importance.
The Dutch budget for 1919 shows for the upkeep of this year, exclusive of salaries, a sum of 113.000 florins payable by the Netherlands.
f) The Drainage of Flanders.
Belgian Flanders being obliged to drain off its superfluous water across the territory of Dutch Flanders, the Belgians complain that this drainage is not effected in the proper manner. The truth is as follows:



this drainage has to be effected in accordance with a convention dated from 1843, which, however, has never been fully carried out. Indeed, the nature of the soil has so changed in the course of time in consequence of the digging of canals, that the drainage system as outlined by the convention could no longer be followed. A Dutch-Belgian committee was instituted (1890) to draft new regulations for the drainage of Flanders. This committee has met several times. It is therefore quite incorrect to say, as has been done by the Belgians, that owing to Dutch dilatoriness, these works have not been heard of since 1908. The committee met at the Hague, Brussels and Sluys during the years immediately preceding the war, and the last time at Bruges in 1913.
A meeting was to have been held at the Hague in August 1914, but was rendered impossible by the war. It appears from all reports published by the committee, that the Belgian members have always greatly appreciated the work of the Dutch chairman, and it is certainly not the latter gentleman who is to be blamed for the interruption of the sessions.
In the work of surveying the district under discussion the Dutch have not shown themselves less active than the Belgians. They ask for nothing better than to resumé these labours with the briefest possible delay. Desiderata submitted by the Belgians will be taken into account in the most conciliatory spirit.
g) The Bouchoute fishermen.
The Belgians complain of the reclaiming, by means of dykes, of the Braakman, a work commenced in 1918, and which has robbed the fishermen of Bouchoute, a small fishing-village on Belgian territory, of a harbour which they had long been in the habit of using. It is however never mentioned at the same time that the work of constructing another and better harbour for these fishermen close to the Isabella Lock was begun



as soon as the work of reclaiming. By an excellent road, which is in course of construction, this new harbour will soon be linked up with the Belgian road to Bouchoute. The distance by this new road to the village is equal to that which separated it from the old wharf. The new harbour will be finished this summer. When they found that it was impossible to preserve the old harbour until the new one was finished, the Dutch authorities stipulated, when granting the contract for the work, that the contractor was not to hinder the communication between vessels stationed on the flats or in the fairway and the banks. He receives directions from the authorities ensuring facilities for the loading and discharging of the boats.
Means for towing the boats as far as the Isabella Lock and for unloading them are already in existence. The Bouchoute fishermen will soon be in more favourable conditions than ever before. They will have a good harbour with mooring-posts, walls and quays and it will then for the first time be possible to speak with truth of a Bouchoute harbour. Whereas hitherto the fishermen also used Philippine on Dutch territory, they will in future have a harbour entirely to themselves.
Let it be borne in mind that these improvements, which serve Belgian interests only, have been entirely carried out at the expense of Holland, though no convention binds her in this respect. Belgium contributes nothing.
It is the same with the drainage-works by way of the Isabella Lock, undertaken during the war by the Dutch government in accordance with existing projects previously agreed upon with Belgium. In carrying out these works, which were undertaken partly to provide work, partly to improve the drainage on Belgian territory, the reclaiming by means of dykes, which would have encouraged the accretion of fertile alluvium, has been abandoned.



conclusions on the present state of the scheldt. The cost of maintenance of the fairway.
We trust we have succeeded in demonstrating that the present situation with regard to the Scheldt has been unjustly attacked by the Belgians, and that the arguments used against Holland are without foundation.
Nothing justifies the theory that Holland abuses her position to the disadvantage of Belgium, and that the latter country's interests are seriously injured in consequence.
At the same time we may emphasize again that if difficulties should be shown to exist, Belgium will always find Holland ready to remedy these by all means in her power.
t would be better if Belgium were to show less distrust and suspicion if she were to insinuate less, as we have seen above that she has done so often. It is only by mutual confidence and goodwill that a question as important as the question of the Scheldt and touching the common interests of Holland and Belgium, can be settled between the two countries. Is it just, for instance, to make, as was done by the Belgians, a grievance of the seizure, in times of peace, of merchant vessels, destined for Belgium, for civil debts, contracted by their owners with Dutch creditors (The "Phoenix", a Danish vessel, and the "Minerva", a German one)? If the Belgians wish to call this hampering the navigation, so they ought to call the seizure, for commercial debts, of any vessel bound for Antwerp, f. i. in port in London or Yokohama. Belgium cannot claim that the normal civil law shall be set aside for her benefit.
With regard to Belgian remarks about the cost of the modern improvements executed in the fairway of the Scheldt, of which the greater part has been charged to Belgium, Holland sees no cause for reproach. According to the treaty of 1839 the latter country is obliged to maintain its part of the river



in a navigable state and to keep the beacons and buoys in repair. This obligation has always been rigorously carried out. As to those Belgian demands that go much further and have reference to a system of buoying, lighting etc. in accordance with the modernization of the navigable channel, Holland has always taken up the following position: whatever is not necessary for the normal maintenance of the channel and concerns alterations and improvements for the special benefit of the shipping of Antwerp, will meet with no objection whatever on the part of the Netherlands, but must be paid for by Belgium. It would be difficult to deny the justice of this position.
h) Proposed new connections with the Rhine.
Antwerp's connection with the Rhine consists iq the first pk ce of the route by way of the great rivers, which now through Dutch territory. It is difficult to see why this should be unfavourable to the Belgian port. On the contrary, Antwerp thus shares all the advantages accruing from the constant improvements which Holland is for ever making on the rivers Wael, Rhine and lower Meuse. We have already spoken of the canal Wemeldinge-Hansweert. It forms part of the connection between Antwerp and the Rhine. Though it is at present sufficiënt for the needs of the Belgian traffic from the Scheldt to the Dutch intermediary waterways, it will always be possible to improve it, if Belgium should demonstrate the utility of such changes.
As to the need of a more direct connection between Antwerp and the Rhine, Holland leaves Belgium free to judge of its advantages. It has never seemed to us either necessary or profitable to undertake the construction of an expensive canal of great width, seeing the excellence of the existing natural waterways. On the other hand we may point out that Holland has never opposed the project, nor will she hamper its execution. Obviously the collaboration of the Dutch



government would be necessary, as far as this canal from the Rhine to the Scheldt would have to cross Dutch territory in Limburg. As Belgium admits, there do not exist any contractual stipulations obliging Holland to such collaboration. In consenting to the construction of the railway from Antwerp to Gladbach by way of Ruremonde in 1873, Holland has completely fulfilled all her obligations, in accordance with Article 12 of the treaty of 1839, which obliged the Netherlands to grant Belgium a right of way across their territory.
Nevertheless the Dutch government have never shown themselves hostile to the Belgian plan in the matter.
In 1912 during the negociations concerning the question of the canalization of the Meuse, Belgium asked Holland's permission to construct a canal from Antwerp to the Rhine across Dutch territory. We can quote with satisfaction what was said by a Dutch Cabinet minister on this subject, word for word: "If "a country like Belgium is for eed by necessity to "make use of a part of Dutch territory for the "establishment of a connection between Antwerp and " Germany, the Dutch Government, placing themselves "on a liberal standpoint, ought not to make use of "this fortuitous circumstance in order to bar Bel"gium's way to the Rhine."
Thus spoke M. L. Regout, minister for Public works, in the Second Chamber of the States General on Dec. 20* 1912.
• Those who allege that Holland systematically favours Rotterdam at the expense of Antwerp will do well to read these words with attention. Responsible bodies, such as the chambers of commerce of Rotterdam and of Amsterdam have endorsed this ministerial view. The question still formed a subject of negociation between Holland and Belgium, when the war broke out. Belgium's answer, dated February 22n<* 1914, was then in course of examination by the Dutch government. The question has since been left unsettled.



It is clear, at any rate that Holland has not taken up a hostile position with regard to Belgium's desire to construct a canal across Dutch Limburg. The treaty of 1839 does not in any sense deprive Antwerp of its communication with the Rhine.
ij The communication of Antwerp with the German "hinterland".
As regards the railroad Communications between Antwerp and its German "hinterland", across Dutch territory, the Netherland Government have given full assistance in the matter by consenting to the Treaty of January 13* 1873 and carrying out its stipulations. The treaty of 1839 obliged Holland, in case Belgium wanted to construct a new canal or highway across the district of Sittard (Dutch), to consent to the extension of this new road across her territory. However instead of a canal or a highway a railroad was constructed, linking up Hamont (Belgium) and Dalheim (Germany). And this railway does not cross the narrow strip of territory opposite Sittard as mentioned in the treaty, but the much wider part of Limburg by way of Weert and Ruremonde. In this question, therefore, Holland has also acquitted herself in a perfectly loyal manner of her recognized duty to do justice to the Belgian interests.
j) Navigation through the "enclave" of Maestricht.
Finally the Belgians frequently complain that the enclave of Maestricht forms a hindrance to the navigation between Liége and Antwerp. The repeated customs formalities, it is said, as well as the impossibility of carrying out improvements in the canal without the consent of both parties, are a source of trouble to the shipping. It is clear that the fact that the canal crosses an enclave, of which the strictly and unalterably



Dutch character has been demonstrated above, must by its very nature cause some delay in the service. Yet it is believed on the Dutch side that everything is done to reduce the loss of time to a minimum. Necessary improvements have always been carried out with the greatest promptitude. It will also in future always be possible to discuss the means of eliminating still existing practical inconveniences. It will however be clear that it is not at all necessary to assail, with respect to such a small matter, the principles which at present govern the Dutch-Belgian relations. Even the cession to Belgian of the enclave of Maestricht, a proposition which cannot, as has been shown, be entertained for a moment, would not solve all the difficulties. So long as the Meuse remains unnavigable through lack of water, the -principal obstacle which hampers navigation in this region will continue to exist. The way to remove all causes of trouble tó Dutch and Belgians alike, is to improve by joint efforts the waterway of the Méuse.
k) The canalisation of the Meuse in Limburg.
The Belgians sometimes complain of the condition of the Meuse in Limburg, alleging that Holland has not done her duty with regard to the navigability of this river and the regulation of its waters. Holland maintains the contrary. She ventures to assert that it is herself and her province of Limburg which have cause for complaint in the lack of cooperation on the part of Belgium in setting up a satisfactory system of regulating the condition of the river. This is plainly shown by the history of the canalization of the Meuse. If the Belgians complain that the Meuse is not navigable after it has entered Dutch territory and that the trade of Liége is hampered in consequence, the facts are there to prove that the Belgians themselves have prevented the development of the Meuse as a navigable



waterway. Holland was in this respect completely at Belgium's mercy.
Already during the revolutionary years from 1830 to 1839 Belgium made use of the Meuse at Hocht as a source of the water-supply for her canals, to wit the canal Liége-Maestricht and for the irrigation of the Campine. This has caused disaster to the navigability of the Meuse below Maestricht. A series of vast works were undertaken by the Belgian government in 1847, 1849 and 1855, which withdraw water from the Limburg Meuse in summer time, precisely when its level is lowest, just when the water is needed most but is least in evidence. The works near Liége have diminished the volume of water on the lower Meuse. Since 1855 the Meuse has ceased to be navigable for a great part of the year, a fact from which all Limburg has greatly suffered. The owners of regular steamship services at Maestricht have been forced to withdraw their steamers from the river. Exportation became a matter of dimculty and the rural population awaited in vain their winter provisions. Moreover the withdrawal of water from the Meuse caused a very strong current in the canal from Maestricht to Bois-leDuc, the Zuid-Willemsvaart, and considerably reduced its capacity. Thus Limburg quickly became a blank spot on the map of Holland's economic activities, and this in consequence of Belgian measures, which moreover were not based on any right whatever. The withdrawal of the water was contrary to the principles established by the Congress of Vienna and to the stipulations of the Dutch-Belgian treaties of 1839 and 1843. This intolerable state of affairs was at last regulated by the treaty of 1863. But on this occasion Holland was forced to grant to Belgium new concessions which have ever since been a source of complaint to the persons in South Limburg whose interests are involved. The quantity of water which Belgium was allowed to withdraw from the Meuse was increased rather than diminished. A subsequent revision in 1873



produced fresh difficulties, making the level at times either too low or too.high, so that floods are to-day of frequent occurrence in Limburg. The navigation of the Meuse on Dutch territory is becoming increasingly difficult. On the Belgian Meuse on the other hand, and particularly between Liége and the French-Belgian frontier, the shipping figures amounted in 1873 to more than doublé those of the Zuid-Willemsvaart between Maestricht and Bois-le-Duc. In reading what M. Jules Schaepkens, chairman of the Chamber of Commerce of Maestricht, has written on the attitude of Belgium towards Limburg, one realizes that Belgium hardly has grounds for complaint, whereas indeed the reverse can be said of Dutch Limburg.
Since the opening of the XXtft century Holland has energetically pressed for the thorough improvement of the Meuse as a natural waterway, on the principle of joint payment for that part of the river possessed in common, each country further defraying the full cost for the part situated on its territory only. But hitherto the Dutch proposals in the interest of navigation have not been fortunate enough to meet on the part of Belgium with the active response which it was hoped they would encounter. A Dutch-Belgian committee of inquiry instituted in 1906 has been hampered in its labours by numerous difficulties raised on the Belgian side. Limburg itself soon showed its discontent and impatience, so that several of its towns established riparian societies called "Maasvereenigingen", whose aïm it is to protest against the present condition of the river and promote its improvement. The number of these societies had in 1915 increased to 44. They demand the canalization of the Meuse without further delay.
It is not possible better to characterize the Belgian point of view in this matter, than by referring to the reply of the Belgian Government to the above mentioned Dutch proposals. In this reply, dated January 22nd 1913, it is stated that Belgium is only willing to



assist in bringing about these improvements "if the "sacrifices involved, not only those of a pecuniary "nature but also as regards the vital interests of the "port of Antwerp, are to find their equivalent in large " compensations''.
The Belgians cannot get away from the pre-conceived idea that the canalization of the Limburg Meuse will serve to increase the traffic of Rotterdam..
Belgian cooperation in the matter was made to depend on "large compensations" in favour of Antwerp, compensations so burdensome from a Dutch point of view that the Dutch Government might eventually prefer to construct a special canal, entirely on Dutch territory, which would dispense with Belgium's collaboration altogether.
The negociations concerning the canalization of the Meuse were broken off by the war.
We venture to think that we have shown in the foregoing exposition that the Dutch government are perfectly ready to take their share in a lasting and reasonable solution of the Meuse question, and that the Belgian government have at times acted in the very manner which the Belgians reproach the Dutch government with, that is to say that they have refused to give assistance in measures necessary to the economic development of a neighbour state from fear of injuring their own country's commercial interests.
The history of the canalization of the Meuse proces once again that the interests of Holland and Belgium are so closely connected that instead of jealousy, discord and strife, friendship and harmony should govern the relations between the two nations.
It is clearly necessary to find a solution of the Meuse question which shall satisfy both countries, and in which special interests are made subordinate to general ones. This can only be done by mutual agreement ; the discord, caused by the present aggressive attitude with regard to the Netherlands and the Treaties of 1839, must be smoothed away.



V.
THE USE OF THE SCHELDT IN TIMES OF WAR.
Holland's position would, as we have said before, be very greatly affected by admitting foreign naval forces on the Scheldt in times of war.
Once such a permission granted, Holland would in spite of herself, become the scène of conflict in a future European war. For this reason Holland has always considered the question of the passing up the Scheldt of foreign naval forces as a question of the most vital importance.
In times of peace the passage of foreign war-ships has never been refused. This principle has been recognized in all the regulations resulting from the treaty of 1839, as for instance in those allowing the freedom of pilotage dues for ships of war bound for Antwerp.
The closing of the Scheldt in war time, however, is the inevitable consequence of the fulfilment by a neutral country, of its duty in maritime warfare.
It is however to be expected, that the application of the principles of the League of Nations will bring about a radical change in such duties. If Holland and Belgium join the League, the Scheldt will no longer be closed to naval forces sent to the assistance of a member attached by an enemy.
It should moreover be noticed that the Dutch Government recognized in August 1914 the right of passage of war vessels belonging to non-belligerent states, which these might be sending to Belgium's assistance in their capacity of guarantors of her neu-



trality. The declarations of war which followed some days afterwards, did however away with this eventuality.
As to the use of the Western Scheldt during the war, the Dutch government have scrupulously observed the prescriptions which in their opinion resulted from the laws of neutrality. The Convention of the Hague forbids all passage of naval forces. All the special measures taken by the Dutch government in August 1914 with regard to the pilotage, the buoying and lighting, the examination of vessels entering the Scheldt, the laying of mines, the occupation of the river by Dutch men-of-war etc. received the unqualified assent of the Belgian government. In a letter to the Belgian representative at the Hague, communicated to the Dutch government on August 12* 1914, the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs declared himself in full accord with these measures. There are, therefore, no reasons for asserting to-day that the taking of these measures constituted a violation of the Belgian rights of the Treaty of 1839.
The Scheldt has remained absolutely closed to the armed forces of all the belligerent powers in the same degree and without exception.
Though Belgium complains of our refusal to allow passage to the German vessels captured by the Belgians at Antwerp, it will yet be necessary to acknowledge that the decision taken by the Dutch government was perfectly correct. The removal of vessels captured or requisitioned by one of the belligerents from their enemies must be regarded as the continuation of a hostile act, and can therefore not be permitted in neutral waters. It should further be remembered that the same prohibition was afterwards applied to the vessels which the Germans captured at Antwerp.
Holland's action of interning some armed Belgian vessels with their crews and the soldiers who were on board of them, which vessels attempted to join the Belgian army at Ostend by way of the Scheldt after the fall of Antwerp, has also been subjected to



criticism. Yet this internment resulted directly from the normal application of the Proclamation of Neutrality, published in August 1914 by the Dutch government, and based on the Convention of the Hague of 1907. By this proclamation it was announced that no warships whatever would be admitted into Dutch waters. It was no more possible to make an exception for these Belgian vessels than it would have been possible to allow an armed vessel from Germany to proceed down the Rhine. The measures in question did in fact only affect one mine-layer and its crew as well as certain small groups of persons on board of tugs which were making for the sea. Clearly, Belgium did not suffer much from them.
Another accusation, founded on anything but the truth, levelled against the Dutch government, is that of partiality in favour of Germany in the application of the neutrality regulations to the Dutch ports. The right of using Dutch ports and waterways was prohibited to German vessels as much as to any others. Once only during the war a German warvessel, the V-69, has taken advantage of the exception made by the Proclamation of Neutrality in case of damage, in conformity with international law with regard to sea-warfare.
As to the transportation of sand and gravel from Germany by way of the Rhine and the Scheldt, the Dutch government have amply justitieel their attitude in their diplomatic publications. It is sufficiënt to say here that this transportation has been prohibited, except for limited quantities under restricting conditions, justified by the normal requirements in times of peace. The Dutch Government found themselves obliged to admit this limited amount of transit of the goods in question because of the economie stipulations in the International Convention concerning the navigation on the Rhine (Rhine Treaty).



VI.
THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE WIELINGEN. PILOTAGE STATION.
Some remarks must still be made about the status of the channel called Wielingen, which constitutes the mouth of the Western Scheldt. The Belgians reproach the Dutch with not having closed to the Germans this approach as it forms a part of the entrance to the port of Zeebrugge.
The fact is, that Holland has carefully applied the rules of neutrality to all her uncontested maritime territory, which is bounded in the South-West by a line drawn vertically to the coast of Dutch Flanders at the point were the land frontier ends. The waters south of this line, including the approaches to the port of Zeebrugge, do not form part of this uncontested domain. It is true that Holland claims the whole of that part of the mouth of the Scheldt, which is called the Wielingen. But it is equally true that Belgium has always claimed territorial rights to the part south of the line mentioned above, the Frontier-treaty of 1843 having only defined the Dutch-Belgian frontier as far a's the coast of the North Sea, without troubling about their continuation into the territorial waters comprising the outlets of the Scheldt.
This question which has never, for that matter, been the object of direct negociations between the two Governments, has always remained in suspense until 1914. It was for this very reason that Holland believed it to be her duty to take into consideration the Belgian



pretensions and to acknowledge the status quo of legal uncertainty, by limiting the measures for the defence of her neutrality to those waters which were incontestably Dutch territory. It will be granted that no objection can be raised against this attitude.
The practical interest of the question of the sovereignty of this spot arose before the war, from the necessity of deciding which of the two countries was entitled to provide it with beacons, buoys, etc.
Another practical point which is sometimes discussed between Belgium and Holland, deals with the latter's right to establish a pilotage station at Zeebrugge. This question has, properly understood, no connection with the one concerning the sovereignty of the Wielingen. If certain Belgian publicists have lost sight of the difference, the mistake is theirs. To find an answer to the pilotage question, it is only necessary to determine the character of the waters before Zeebrugge, and to settle whether or no they form part of the mouth of the Scheldt. The establishment of a pilotage station can only be made to depend on the special convention concerning the matter, and does not touch on the question of sovereignty at all.



CONCLUSION.
We have accomplished the task we had set ourselves. We have, with regard to the Dutch-Belgian relations, on the one hand set forth Holland's rights and interests, and on the other her willingness to offer to Belgium as many facilities as possible. We have shown, moreover, that Holland has been the object of a good deal of unjustifiable distrust and a good many undeserved insinuations from the Belgian side. This must be changed: confidence, frankness and goodwill must be established in the relations between the two nations, in order that they may live in perfect harmony. These two countries should not be allowed to drift apart. A settlement, satisfactory to both, is the end to be kept in view. Ill-founded complaints should henceforth be banished from the discussions. The public opinion of the whole worfd, which it has been the object of this pamphlet to enlighten, should favour this aim.