there will be immense quantities of merchandise laid up, impossible to transport; on the other hand, some commodities will be so much in demand that their price will become prohibitive, sothat large industries will be doomed to inactivity. Take the case of Russian grain and American and Egyptian and Indian cotton. Supposing the next crops are gathered, before the existing ones are realised and consumed? We would probably see attempts at wholesale "valorisations" after the Brazilian style; but who couldfinancesuch operations, which, in time of peace, were difficult enough?
It is, for all these reasons, quite possible, that after another twelve months of war a general state of exhaustion and of moral depression will set in, which will pave the way for negotiations. This would jeopardize the future of Europe almost as much as a German victory, because an old-fashioned peace, with all its inherent potentialities for further strife, would then become unavoidable. German militarism would remain as truculent as ever, because it could not be accused of having been beaten.
At the time of writing, both groups are making frantic efforts for obtaining the help of neutrals, who are being influenced by alternate coaxing and bullying, by press-campaigns and diplomatic efforts in the good old style. With regard to the small neutrals, they have no reason to place any confidence in any assurances of future rewards, for they would