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§ 57.


dale, Président de la Cour de première instance, cite une décision du „Judicial Committee of the Privy Councü" dans les termes expressifs suivants:

„I have not any doubt — I should not have any right to have any doübt — that Lord Parker was correct in saying etc ".

Voir aussi 1'argumentation dans le jugement relatif au Ran (1185a).

(2) Cependant, en matière de prises maritimes cette force obligatoire de la jurisprudence des tribunaux n'est pas admise au même degré qu'en matière de droit national, comme ü appert des décisions suivantes :

Gutenfels, n°. 1 (40) : discussion de la question de savoir, si un sujet ennemi est autorisé, ou non, a réclamer devant une cour britannique sa propriété capturée, lorsqu'il se prévaut des bénéfices d'une convention internationale, et si, par conséquent, dans ces circonstances, la cour peut suspendre 1'ancienne règle du droit anglais qui dénie aux „alien enemies" le ius standi in iudicio [voir a ce sujet §§ 109 et 110]. La Cour des prises pouiT'Egypte s'exprime dans les termes suivants:

I think that it is not the right, but the duty of the Court so to alter itspractice [comp. aussi § in] from time to time as to reflect the changing conditions of civilisation that it has to serve. Now there can be no doubt that the general attitude of mind and conditions of thought of civilised mankind has greatiy altered during the last hundred years, and an endeavour has been made to formulate this changed opimon m the various International Conventions that have been signed at Berne, the Hague and elsewhere, and it is just and right that the milder views of the present generation should find an echo in the procedure of our Prize Courts The fact is that the rule (concernant les „aken enemies") is a bad rule, much more to be honoured in the breach than m the observance; and if we must acknowledge ourselves to be so far fettered by the dead hand of outworn precedent as to recogmse its continued existence, I am, at any rate, determined to permit all such breaches of it as my sense of equity and fair dealing towards the enemy

may demand" Saa , ,'. . u

Odessa and Coj>e Corso (32): „The décisions of a Court of law should proceed upon defined principles. Those principles have to be apphed to ever-varying sets of facts. But the Court has the function and duty not merely of deciding individual cases, but of determimng them upon principles which shall be a guide to others as to what their positions and riehts are in the eye of the law. — In the domain of International Law, in particular, there is room for the extension of old doctrines or the devel opment of new principles, where there is or is even likely to be a