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§ 65.

des „Prize Court Rules. 1914", portant, dans sa rédaction de 1915 : „(1) Where it is made to appear to the Judge on the application of the proper Officer of the Crown that it is desired to requisition on behalf of His Majesty a ship [l'„Order" s'apphque de même aux marchandises] 111 respect of which no f inal decree of condemnation has been made, he shall order that the ship shall be appraised, and that upon an undertaking being given in accordance with Rule 5 of this Order the

ship shah be released and delivered to the Crown

(5) In every case of requisition under this Order an undertaking in wntrng shall be füed by the proper Officer of the Crown for payment

into Court on behalf of the Crown of the appraised value of the ship *'

Dans sa décision en date du 21 juin 1915, Sir Samuel Evans se sert de 1'argumentation suivante :

Les réclamants prétendent que 1'„Order" est contraire au droit des gens et par conséquent ne lie pas la Cour des prises. Cette assertion n'est pas juste. D'abord, abstraction faite de toute réglementation expresse,

„the Court has inherent powers to deal with the property brought within its jurisdiction, .... apart from any rules of practice made under the Pnze Acts of 1864 and 1894", les personnes réclamant des marchandises saisies n'ayant „no right by any rule of international law to demand that the property should be preserved in specie until the final decree determines whether it is to be released or to be condemned " [voir aussi § 30.]

En outre, la Cour se trouve en présence d'un „Order" spécial, lequel confirme ces „inherent powers" :

„But, apart from any inherent power of the Court, the Order deals expressly with the matter, and prescribes the practice tobe pursued 1 will consider hereafter the larger question whether this Order violates an acknowledged and settled principle of the law of nations, and whether it it does, it nevertheless, as an Order made by His Majesty in Council' must be observed and obeyed by this Court. - Before approaching ""POrt^t subject, I must declare that, in my view, Urder XXIX deals only with a matter affecting the procedure and practice ot the court — a domestic affair in which no foreign neutral or enemy has any voice or right to interfere" [voir aussi § rtïj.

Comme tel, l'„Order in Council" est indubitablement valable. Mais supposé que l'„Order" ne puisse être censé contenir simplement „a regulation of practice and procedure", il n'en est pas moins valable, paree que les décisions précédentes de la juridiction nationale (c.a.d. : la „law of nations" anglaise) attribuaient pareil droit de réquisition a la Couronne [voir aussi § 756]. Cette opinion est confirmée par la pratique judiciaire d'autres nations belligérantes.