Even if the provisions of the Act were merely declaratory of the international lawPthe anthority of the Court, as an int erpretet• of thelawof nations, would be thereby materially weakened, for no one could say whether its décisions were based on a due consideration of mternational tCSoL, or on the binding nature of the Act itself. The fhowever that the Prize Courts in this country would be bound by Acts of the Imirial Legislature affords no ground for argmng that they are bound bv the Executive Orders of the Kingm Councü.
Alors les Lords remettent en mémoire le rapport pubhe, le I» ianvier'1753, par le Comité des jurisconsultes établi par le Ren d'Angleterre, afin de rédiger sa réponse aux plaintes du Roi de Prusse relatives a certaines captures de navires prussiens operees par les batiments de guerre anglais durant la guerre avec la France
et 1'Espagne : ,
This report is, in their Lordships' opinion, conclusive that in i753 any notion of a Prize Court, being bound by the Executive Orders of the Crown or having to administer municipal as opposed to international law, was contrary to the best legal opinion of the day.
C'est pourquoi la Cour d'appel'infirme expressement „the remarkable passage quoted in fuU in the Courtbelow. which tó^ to the King in Councü possessing „legislative nghts over a Court of Prize analogous to those possessed by Parliament over the Courts o cZaZ^. At most this amounts to a dictum, and in then: Lordships opinion, with aü due respect to so great an authority, the dictum is erroneous It is in fact quite irreconcüable with the principles enunciated by Lord Stowell himself." Ainsi, les Lords concluent: that, at any rate, prior to the Naval Prize Act, 1864, there was no power in the Crown by Order in Councü to prescribe or alter the law which Prize Courts have to administer."
Et ü en est de même postérieurement a eet „Act . Mais, la Cour d'appel va plus loin, elle va jusqa'a rejeter 1'idée de la soumission du juge des prises aux „Orders in Councü", même dans le cas ou le droit international n'est pas certain et que partant il ne peut etre question de violation flagrante du droit des gens
There are two further points requiring notice m this part of the'case. TnSari^s on the argument addressed to the Board by the^ohator^ General It may be, he said, that the Court would not be bound by an Sr ii Council Vhich is manifestly contrary to the «g^dn^ of international law, but that there are regions in which such law is unperfèX ascertained and defined; and when this is so, it would not be unrConlble to hold that the Court *Wd subordmate^ own^pnuon to thê directions of the Executive. This argument is open to the same objection as the argument of the Attorney-Genend. H the Court is to