of October 29, 1914. The point is novel. It might have been taken, but was not, in The Louisiana (908). The contrary was assumed to be the case, although it is true there had been no argument, by their Lordships' Board in The Proton (927). It was not taken by the Crown before the learned President in the present case, nor is a contention plausible which involves the proposition that an Order directing goods to be restored „unless they are contraband" is an Order condemning them, if they are, all other Orders notwithstanding. The words „unless they are contraband of war" naturally mean that the Order in question does not apply to such goods for which there are other legal provisions.
Their Lordships, however, hold, for two reasons of a somewhat more general character, that the Order in Council of October 29,1914, was not in this particular affected by the Order in Council of March XX., 1915. The whole tenor of the Order of July, 7, 1916, the recitals, the repeal, and the re-enactment are consistent only with the view that the Order of October 29,1914, had upto that date remained in full force and unaffected. Further, although no form of words and no formal instrument can be prescribed to the Crown, by which to revoke its former grant or to resumé the full beüigerent rights which had previously been waived, it is at least necessary that the intention to revoke and the intimation of the resumption should be unambiguous and clear. It would ill become the dignity of the Crown and be httle congruous with its responsibüity, alike towards its subjects and to neutrals, in exercising or forbearing to exercise belligerent rights, if concessions publicly and advisedly made were to be recalled by words of doubtful import or by nice implications from language unquestionably employed alio intuitu
C. Extension successive des présomptions légales de destination ennemie en matière de contrebande. [Comp. §§ 435 et ss. ; 439 et ss.]
85. Tandis qu'au sujet de l'application de la doctrine du voyage continu [voir sous B, § 80 et ss.] les juridictions des prises semblent n'avoir pas du tout douté de la solution a donner a la question de droit transitoire, leur jurisprudence paralt plus divisée par rapport aux présomptions légales. De même que, dans le domaine de la procédure civile, les opmions différent sur 1'effet rétroactif ou non-rétroactif des régies relatives a 1'administration de la preuve, y compris 1'étabhssement de praesumtiones iuris, la juridiction des prises a montré quelque hésitation a trancher la controverse.
Pour la Cour de Londres, la question de droit se réduit a savoir si le principe généralement reconnu de la non-rétroactivité des dispositions légales relatives au droit matériel (substantive rights) s'étend de même au droit concernant la procédure et la preuve,