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§ 335.


§§ 442 et s., 482] serait également applicable. Voir la décision : United States, n°. 1 (518), navire danois transportant de Copenhague aux Etats-Unis des marchandises d'origine ennemie, mais commandées et en partie payées avant le 11 mars 1915 par des ressortissants neutres (américains). Les marchandises avaient été expédiées des fabriques allemandes après la promulgation du „Reprisals Order".

„The Crown claims an order for the detention or sale of certain goods seized on a voyage from Copenhagen to the United States on the doublé ground (a) that the goods were of enemy origin, and (b) that they were enemy property. The apphcation is made under article IV of the „Reprisals" Order in Councü of March iï, 1915.

It is not disputed that the goods were of enemy origin; but the claimants contended that they were neutral property, on the ground that before seizure the property had passed from the respective vendors in

Germany to the respective purchasers in America The question

for décision is whether they were „enemy property" for the purpose of that Order. Putting it in another form, had the goods in these circumstances lost their enemy character and acquired a neutral character before the seizure ? [suivent quelques observations sur les points de différence et de ressemblance entre le „Reprisals Order" et le droit de

blocus] But although there is this important distinction between

the results of the working of the Order and of the strict application of the law of blockade, it is obvious that the Order deals with maritime commerce during war upon the analogy of the law of prize.

Indeed, it is under the International Law of Prize that the Order, as one of reprisal, derives its vahdity. - It is essential, therefore, to see how the question of the passing of property was regarded by the International Law of Prize [suivent les passages cités au § 260]

Having regard to the doctrine of continuous voyage, it makes no material düference that at the one end or the other there is a transit by land and just as goods from New-York to Germany intended to be deüvered to the enemy are regarded as „enemy property", so goods from Germany to New-York are also regarded as „enemy property", qua the rights of the captors. The same principles must be appüed, whether the goods are being carried from East to West or from West to East. To hold otherwise would be to encourage colourable transactions set up for the purpose of misleading and defrauding captors - see The Baltica. - Upon this analogy I hold that „enemy property" in the „Reprisals" Order in Councü was intended to mean, and does mean, property which is to be regarded

as of „enemy character" in time of war To hold otherwise would

make aü the provisions of the Order as to „enemy property" nugatory because, in order to defeat them, aü that would be necessary would be" that an enemy and his sympathetic neutral should take such steps as would make aü goods shipped to and from Germany in theory and on paper the property of the neutral in the strict legal sense