vïsions oi the Treaty, I find it difficult to discover any point of time at which the condition of the citizens of Danzig can be differentiated from the condition of the general body of the citizens of Germany so as to vest in the State of Danzig any property of which, by reason of the results of the war, they had become divested. The state of the case, apart from particular provisions in the Treaty, was this - that during the war German citizens residing in Danzig had been lawfully deprived of certain moveable property of theirs — namely, steamships — which had been found in the ports of Great Britain under such conditions that, unless during the war the rulers of the German State came to terms with the Government of Great Britain as to those ships, those ships were subject to condemnation. During the war no terms were made with regard to those ships, and they at all points of time during the war were, applying, as I must, the judgment in The Marie Leonhardt, subject to condemnation. I have to consider the fact that the transfer of the allegiance of the citizens of Danzig was made by the Treaty, and came into existence notionally the moment after the conclusion of the war — that is, upon the conclusion of the war. Can it be said there was then revested in the citizens of Danzig any property of which in the course of the war they had been deprived ? I have not been able to discover any grounds upon which, apart from any express agreement, it can be said that those citizens would have rights which other German citizens would not have immediately upon the conclusion oi the war. Immediately upon the ratification of the Treaty of Peace the citizens of Germany were in amity with this country, and immediately on the operation of the Treaty of Peace the citizens of the Free City of Danzig were in amity with this country. .They were in each instance the subjects of foreign friendly Powers. I cannot find any ground upon which I could admit the citizens of Danzig, apart from express provision in the Treaty, to have acquired rights in these ships without setting up the proposition that citizens of Germany, except so far as they were expressly divested by Treaty, acquired by the
conclusion of peace similar rights. ... In the absence of authority
and in the absence of any argument founded upon reason .... I come .... to the conclusion that, apart from any express term in the Treaty, the claimants are in no better position than were the owners of the Marie Leonhardt.
I have to consider, then, what the case is with regard to the clauses of the Treaty. [Suit une explication des clauses relatives du traité de Versailles, se terminant par le passage suivant:] That being so, it appears to me that, international law without the Treaty not creating any privilege in the citizens of Danzig in respect of the matters here under consideration, that Treaty itself shows that it was the intention of the contracting parties, upon the conclusion of the Treaty, to leave the citizens of Danzig in the same position internationally as were the citizens of Germany as a whole — that is, to leave them subject to the right of the Allied and Associated Powers to retain and liquidate their property, rights, and interests ; to deal with them, in fact so far as international