the ravenous lust of wealth and power." Here, then, we have militarism, ultramilitarism, as the dangerous result of Byzantinism.
The victories of 1866 and 1871 were so brilliant, that it is hardly surprising that they engendered megalomania in a race, so little accustomed to political greatness. The mistake of 1871 which tore two provinces from France, had never ceased to remind France of further danger from the East. Thisdrove France and her saved milliards of francs into the arms of Russia. And so Germany was threatened, or thought herself threatened, from the East as well as from the West. Byzantinism, ultra-militarism and fear of aggression! Surely the powder-mine had but to be touched to explode! Germany could not "be safe without being dangerous."
But the question is yet more complicated. It was not enough for Germany's vain ambition to be in a position to sell ever increasing quantities of manufactured articles in the foreign markets of the world. It was not enough, that her newly acquired wealth enabled her to build cities and factories, gaudier and finer than anywhere else in the world, albeit of more than doubtful taste. It was not enough that her workmen received high wages, that emigration to foreign colonies became well-nigh superfluous, that on the contrary foreign labour had to be imported. It was not enough that her mercantile fleetincreased by leaps and bounds. For still there was an almost uncons-