le 26 septembre ou le 4 octobre 1914 (donc sous la vigueur du premier „Order in CouncU" du 20 aoüt 1914) a bord du vapeur néerlandais Katwijk (107), en route pour Rotterdam, pour le motif que ladite cargaison était destinée a 1'AUemagne, eüe a dü se prononcer sur la doctrine a 1'égard de cargaisons de grande valeur qui avaient été capturées également avant la promulgation du deuxième „Order in CouncU" du 29 octobre 1914 [comp. §§ 80 et ss., 84], et eUe 1'a admise comme faisant partie du droit des gens coutumier actueUement en vigueur : Kim, Alfred Nobel, Björnstjerne Björnson and Fridland (167).
„Two important doctrines familiar to international law come prominently forward for consideration. The one is embodied in the rule as to „continuous voyage" or „continuous transportation" ....
The doctrine of „continuous voyage" was first apphed by the English Prize Courts to unlawful trading. There is no reported case in our Courts where the doctrine is applied in terms to the carriage-of contraband. But it was so apphed and extended by the United States Courts against this country in the time of the American Civü War, and its application was acceded to by the British Government of the day, and was, moreover, acted upon by the International Commission which sat under the treaty between this country and America, made at Washington on May 8, 1871, when the commission, composed of an Italian, an American, and a British delegate, unanimously disallowed the claims in the Peterhoff (5 Wall. 28), which was the leading case upon the subject of continuous transportation in relation to contraband goods. (The other well-known American cases — for example, the Stephen Hart, the Bermuda, and the Springbok — considered and applied the doctrine in relation to attempted breaches of the blockade.) liEP
I am not going through the history of it, but the doctrine was asserted by Lord Salisbury at the time of the South African War with reference to German vessels carrying goods to Delagoa Bay, and as he was dealing with Germany he fortified himself by referring to the view of Bluntschli as the true view. .. ."
Après ce court exposé historique tendant a démontrer que la doctrine a été pratiquée déja pendant des guerres antérieures [comp. § 52] et après avoir mentionné la solution donnée par la Conférence navale de Londres, Sir Samuel Evans remarque a propos de cette solution: „As is usual in compromises, there seems to be an absence óf logical reason for the exclusion (in the case of conditional contraband). If it is right that a belügerent should be permitted to capture absolute contraband proceeding by various voyages or transport with an ultimate destination for the enemy territory, why should he not be allowed to capture goods which, though not absolutely contraband, become contraband by reason of a further destination to the enemy Government or its armed