on the outward voyage, however that voyage was conceived or carried out. In one aspect of the present case no question relating to the law applicable to the return voyage would arise. In the other, it would ; and I wül therefore consider the question later."
Ensuite, la cour examina „the aspect first referred to", a savoir que, dans 1'espèce, la question de droit visée ci-dessus ne se posait point, paree que 1'intention hostüe du voyage avait été abandonnée avant qu'eüe püt être réalisée :
„The original intention of the owner was to carry contraband goods to, and deliver them to, the enemy. That intention continued untü the vessel failed to obtain bunker coal at Teneriffe, and possibly untü the sale. But in fact the goods were never carried or delivered to the enemy at all; on the contrary, they were sold and delivered to a British firm. This course was no doubt forced upon the vendor, but in these circumstances could any penalty afterwards attach to the ship arising out of the original intention and its attempted performance ? According to the principles of prize law, if the intention and voyage have been clearly abandoned before seizure or capture, the offence is dissipated and purged, and neither the goods nor the carrying instrument and subject to the penalty of confiscation, the delictum being over. This is the reason, I think, why no authority can be produced to the contrary. A simüar principle applies where vessels have intended to run a blockade
Two cases may be referred to in ülustration of the apphcation of the doctrine in reference to blockade and contraband respectively, even where the voyage had been abandoned, or its character changed, by force of circumstances outside the voluntary intention of those responsible for the vessel and goods. Both were decided by Sn William Scott.... (citation des décisions Lisette  et Trende Söstre ; dans le dernier de ces cas le navire était en route pour le Cap de la Bonne Espérance avec un chargement de contrebande, lorsque cette colonie hoüandaise se rendit aux Anglais et devint une possession britannique; les marchandises ayant ainsi perdu, en fait, leur destination a l'ennemi, le juge des prises en ordonna la libération, bien que 1'intention du capitaine n'eüt pas
changé) The same principle has been adopted and acted upon in the
most recent wars by the Prize Courts of other countries.... (citation des affaües Lydia , Lincluden  et Sishan , jugées par
les cours de prises japonaises) — It will be observed also from the
authorities, and from the provisions of the Déclaration of London as modüied and adopted, .... that the assumption has always been that the contraband goods have been captured in delicto whüe upon the intended voyage to the enemy destination ; or in the case of a capture of a vessel on her return or homeward voyage that the contraband goods had actuaüy been delivered to the enemy or carried to the enemy destination.
Upon this aspect of the present case I am of opinion that the result, according to the principles and rules of international law, is that, inasmuch as the original intention to carry and deliver the contraband goods