ferred by municipal law, is not as such enforceable in a Court which administers international law. The fact, however, that the Crown possesses such a right in this country, and that somewhat similar rights are claimed by most civüised nations, may well give rise to the expectation that, at any rate in times of war, some right on the part of a belligerent Power to requisition the goods of neutrals within its jurisdiction will be found to be recognised by international usage. Such usage might be expected either to sanction the right of each country to apply in this respect its own municipal law or to recognise a simüar right of international obligation.
In support of the former alternative, which is apparently accepted by Albrecht (Zeitschrift für Völkerrecht und Bundesstaatsrecht, VI. Band, Breslau, 1912), it may be argued that the mere fact of the property of neutrals being found within the jurisdiction of a belligerent Power ought, according to international law, to render it subject to the municipal law of that jurisdiction. The argument is certainly plausible, and may in certain cases and for some purposes be sound. In general, property belonging to the subjects of one Power is not found within territory of another Power without the consent of the true owner, and this consent may well operate as a submission to the municipal law. A distinction may perhaps be drawn in this respect between property the présence of which within the jurisdiction is of a permanent nature, and property the présence of which within the jurisdiction is temporary only .... Different considerations arise with regard to a vessel brought within the territorial jurisdiction in exercise of a right of war. In the latter case there is no consent of the owner or of any one whose consent might impose obligations on the owner. Nevertheless even here the vessel might well, for police and sanitary purposes, become subject to the municipal law. To hold, however, that it became so subject for all purposes, including the municipal right of requisition, would give rise to various anomalies.
The municipal law of one nation in respect of the right of requisitioning the property of its subjects differs, or may differ, from that of another nation. The circumstances under which, the purposes for which, and the conditions subject to which the right may be exercised need not be the same .... It would be anomalous if the international law by which all nations are bound could only be ascertained by an enquiry into the municipal law which prevaüs in each. It would be a stül greater anomaly if in times of war a belligerent could, by altering his municipal law in this respect, affect the rights of other nations or their subjects. The authorities point to the conclusion that international usage has in this respect developed a law of its own, and has not recognised the right of each nation to apply its own municipal law.
The right of a beüigerent to requisition the goods of neutrals found within its territory, or territory of which it is in military occupation, is recognised by a number of writers on international law. It is sometimes referred to as the right of angary, and is generaUy recognised as involving