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speaking as a means, by which living beings, whether consciously or not, influence the behaviour of their fellowbeings.

The mental disposition in the speaker, which brings about the act of speaking, is called "speaker's meaning", the mental reaction in the hearer is called "hearer's meaning".

These conceptions belong to what is best called general significs, a doctrine, developed particularly by Mannoury and dealing, on psychological and sociological lines, with phenomena of understanding in general. In my opinion, general significs so far retains a more or less speculative character; this applies i.a. to the distinction of indicative, emotional and volitional elements of meaning in an act of speaking. Anyhow, it is obvious, that the different starting-points, which respectively characterize significs and logic, lead to entirely divergent notions of meaning.

If we pass on to dealing with more concrete problems, however, there undeniably are points of contact between significs and logic. With regard to current terminology (or terminologies) in psychology and to traditional problems of metaphysics and gnoseology, for instance, the dutoh school from the point of view of significs raise nearly the same objections as the Vienna circle from the logical side.

Both schools aim at eliminating pseudo-problems. A statement by W. Hollitscher <0 ; "Er (der Historiker) betrachtet allerdings die Satze der Philosophen nicht als Symbole, als Zeichen, sondern als Symptome, als Anzeichen eines Bestimmten Habitus derer, die sie verfechten und die sie glauben. Er fragt nicht nach ihrem Wahrheitswert oder ihrem Sinngehalt, bei der Deduktion eines Satzes nicht nach seiner Begründung, sondern nach der kausalen Ursache i'hrer Produktion und ihrer Konsumtion", is characteristic of the conformity of view with regard to these questions.

Nevertheless, even with respect to the foundations of science, there is no complete agreement between logic and significs.

6) W. Hollitscher, "Logische Bemerkungen zur Aufgabe der Geschichte der Philosophie", Actes du Congrès &c., fase. VIII.