Onderstaande tekst is niet 100% betrouwbaar

des deutschen Volkes und des Fiihrerbefehls" 40). Should one interpret § 242 StGB in the same manner as Dahm attributes to Professor Schwinge of Marburg, namely that it protects the right of property, then one would be bound to consider that it is a case of theft when Hitler-Youth snatch a banner from a Catholic Youth Organization and burn it as a trophy. "Wir nehmen keinen Diebstahl an, weil Dieb nicht ein jeder ist, der eine fremde bewegliche Sache einem anderen wegnimmt, dieselbe sich rechtswidrig zuzueignen, sonldern nur, wer seinem Wesen nach Dieb ist"41).

The Schwinge mentioned here, together with L. Zimmerl, his colleague in Marburg, has very sharply criticized both Schmitt and, above all, the Kieler-school. The demand is put forward for a realistic legal science as a counter-weight to all vague teaching and all irrationalism in the new German doctrine. First and foremost according to Schwinge and Zimmerl the young jurists are misled by such theories42). The practising judges have, also, more than once complained of the lack of feeling for reality, appearing in the legal theoretical literature. This was not the case during the epoch, when the German legal science with reason erijoyed an international reputation. Whereas, now, one prefers to begin from the top with the abstract investigations of principles, at that time one worked "von unten nach oben", from the basic factual research to the theoretical criticism. "Eine solche an der Erfahrung gesattigte und an der Erfahrung gereifte philosophische Haltung — das ist es, was der heutigen deutschen Rechtswissenschaft not tut" 43). This realistic research into criminal law requires clear definitions and unambiguous norms in the interest of the safety of the law. It requires respect for the great forerunners of earlier German legal science, and it, also, dar es to represent the German legal conception as the outcome of a long historical development.

40) Dahm: Verbrechen und Tatbestand. Grundfragen der neuen Rechtswissenschaft. Berlin 1935, p. 101.

«) Ibid. p. 102.

42 E. Schwinge und L. Zimmerl: Wesensschau und konkretes Ordnungsdenken im Strafrecht. Bonn 1937, pp. 109 et seq.

43) Ibid. p. 13.